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Abstract This article is the result of an international research between law and ethics
scholars from Universities in France and Switzerland, who have been closely collab-
orating with technical experts on the design and use of information and communication
technologies in the fields of human health and security. The interdisciplinary approach
is a unique feature and guarantees important new insights in the social, ethical and legal
implications of these technologies for the individual and society as a whole. Its aim is to
shed light on the tension between secrecy and transparency in the digital era. A special
focus is put from the perspectives of psychology, medical ethics and European law on
the contradiction between individuals’ motivations for consented processing of personal
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data and their fears about unknown disclosure, transferal and sharing of personal data
via information and communication technologies (named the ‘‘privacy paradox’’).
Potential benefits and harms for the individual and society resulting from the use of
computers, mobile phones, the Internet and social media are being discussed. Fur-
thermore, the authors point out the ethical and legal limitations inherent to the pro-
cessing of personal data in a democratic society governed by the rule of law. Finally,
they seek to demonstrate that the impact of information and communication technology
use on the individuals’ well-being, the latter being closely correlated with a high level
of fundamental rights protection in Europe, is a promising feature of the socalled ‘‘e-
democracy’’ as a new way to collectively attribute meaning to large-scale online
actions, motivations and ideas.
Keywords Privacy  Information technology  Health  Security 
Fundamental rights  Data protection  Democracy
The relationship between technology and humanity dates back to the beginning of
human societies. Humans have been initiating technological change and inversely,
technology has been shaping our behaviour, be it on the individual level or that of
society. According to Strum and Latour (1999), it is precisely the use of materials
and symbols that singles out human societies. For MacKenzie and Wajcman (1999),
material resources ‘‘are part of what makes large-scale society feasible’’. Instead of
being separate from society, they are constitutive of it. Indeed, information and
communication technologies (ICT, European Commission 2001) such as tele-
phones, computers and the Internet facilitate getting and staying connected in
conformity with ‘‘everyone’s fundamental right to communicate’’.1 In relation with
business activities, ICT ease the communication between economic operators and
thus contribute to the development and functioning of markets. Because it increases
‘‘electronic gridlock’’ (European Commission 2010), technological progress may
however bear certain risks. Indeed, P. Virilio recalls that it is impossible to
disconnect technological progress from ignorance and accidents. According to this
author, ‘‘inventing the ship amounts to inventing its sinking, inventing the train
amounts to inventing its derailment, inventing the plane amounts to inventing its
crash’’ (Gaudriault 2013). New developments in ICT undeniably offer benefits such
as faster and more cost-efficient information sharing, including for purposes of
human health and security, for example by enabling the delivery of more focussed,
purposeful, and lean services, thus facilitating the ‘‘promotion of healthy lifestyles
and independent living’’ (Rigby et al. 2013). Regarding individual health care, the
use of ICT opens up the perspective ‘‘to keep the elderly and the disabled in their
own homes rather than in the considerably more expensive hospital or nursing home
systems’’ (OECD 2013). The European Union (EU)’s Early Warning and Response
System aimed at fighting the spread of communicable diseases is an example of
1 This right is being promoted by the International Telecommunications Union: http://www.itu.int/en/
about/Pages/overview.aspx. Accessed 2 July 2013.
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preventive public health measure. The link between human health and security with
regard to ICT may be explained by the occasional correlation between health data
and administrative and financial data (OECD 2013). In exceptional circumstances,
the processing of such data may serve the investigation, through public bodies, on
suspected persons involved in serious crimes, including acts of terrorism.
While offering benefits in terms of individual and public health and security, the
use of ICT bears also threats for creeping intrusions into privacy. Hence, it may lead
to enhanced vulnerability of individuals especially with regard to their relationship
with powerful public and private bodies: the new privacy concerns may ‘‘range from
modest risks to the privacy of activity data (like data collected by a pedometer) to
safety-critical risks (like the integrity of software in an insulin pump)’’ (OECD 2013).
More generally, the reasons behind the increased vulnerability of individuals’
privacy are threefold. First of all, the growing sophistication of ICT leads to more
frequent and rapid processing of growing amounts of personal data (European
Commission 2010)2 considered as data enabling personal identification. Secondly, the
increased vulnerability of a person with regard to the respect for his/her privacy is
directly linked to the diversification of personal data, such as genomic data, laboratory
data, diagnostic data, and image data (OECD 2013). Thirdly, vulnerability can be
caused by the removal of three types of barriers to data processing: geographical
(globalization enhancing the exchange of data for commercial purposes and the fight
against international pandemics, terrorism, serious organised crime), operational
(through increasing interoperability between ICT systems, Kierkegaard 2012),3 and
technological (through the fusion by multimedia of numerous transmission and
expression forms of data and images, Banisar and Davies 1999). On the one hand,
enhanced technological sophistication, data diversification and the progressive removal
of obstacles to data processing give rise to new threats to privacy. These threats are new
because they go beyond the traditional threats to ‘‘freedom from intrusion and
surveillance’’ to cover ‘‘threats to personal autonomy and personal freedoms, including
political freedoms—and […extend] to society at large’’ (European Commission 2010).
On the other hand, social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, etc. represent a
new promising venue for promoting various societal changes for the better or the worse.
Social media can enhance and have enhanced citizen and public empowerment through
today’s information technologies (IT). With respect to this idea, major social and
political changes in the Internet era have largely benefited from online information
sharing. Consequently, information privacy is at the heart of this new phenomenon.
Interestingly, the relationship between ICT and privacy reveals a ‘‘paradox’’4 in
the sense that it combines contradictory features. More precisely, this relationship is
2 Since the European Commission proposed the first Data Protection Directive in the 1990 s, ‘‘[t]he
internet has moved out of the university lab into 56 % of European homes and 95 % of OECD
businesses’’.
3 For example, in the medical field ‘‘[i]nteroperability can be defined as the capability for independent
and heterogenous health information systems to exchange health-related data for use by doctors,
healthcare providers and patients’’.
4 According to the Oxford Dictionaries, a ‘‘paradox’’ is ‘‘a person or thing that combines contradictory
features or qualities’’: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/paradox?q=paradox. Accessed 2
July 2013.
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characterized by a constant tension between secrecy and transparency. On the one
hand, individuals fear threats to their personal autonomy and freedoms stemming
from globalized data processing by governments and undertakings, while on the
other hand they voluntarily proceed to the disclosure of personal data (e.g. by
posting names, photographs, dates of birth, marital status on social networking sites,
or medical data on health forums). We intend to shed light on this ‘‘privacy
paradox’’ (Norberg et al. 2007; Kaplan 2012) and make suggestions from social,
ethical and legal perspectives for dealing with it.
In clinical psychology and medicine, keeping secret one person’s medical record,
including data related to psychological symptoms, is a key to the therapist-patient
confidential relationship (Brosset 2012). Without this safeguard, many persons will
choose not to seek the services they need (OECD 2013). At the same time,
disclosing medical data is essential for furthering scientific knowledge (e.g. in large-
scale clinical research projects where huge amounts of medical data are collected,
stored, transferred and analyzed). Even though medical data sharing responds to
ethical requirements (e.g. avoid unnecessary repetition of collecting biological
samples) and financial constraints, it is subject to limitations (e.g. Verdier-Bu¨schel
2013). Indeed law, while creating the conditions for the development of
technological progress (e.g. via the freedom to conduct a business, the right to
protection of intellectual property), also limits the use of ICT (e.g. through the rights
to protection of private life, and of personal data). Law thus has a double function: it
provides support for the transformations of society induced by technological
progress and at the same time shapes the latter through its inherent efficiency
(Chevallier 1983; Cattan 2012).
Focussing on the study of human behaviour is the object of social sciences such
as psychology and sociology. They provide methods that allow identifying the
possible existence of links between certain kinds of technologies and specific
expressions of human behaviour. In this respect, Beck (1992) argues that progress is
not merely a process that happens to societies, but may (or should) become one that
is actively and democratically shaped by them. The recent big changes fostered by
the Web 2.0 mass communication tools, such as Facebook and Twitter represent a
new milestone of the globalization process and for promoting democracy (e.g.
Leighninger 2011). An outstanding example witnessed at the sunset of this IT era is
the very fast and spectacular unfolding of events triggered by the first Arab spring
wave of protest in Tunisia where the youth were given an unprecedented
opportunity to spread revolutionary ideas and promote a highly self-organized
movement, exclusively made possible by these new IT applications. A psycholog-
ical study has shown that the use of ICT in the Arab spring movement has
‘‘revolutionize[d] revolutions’’ (Marzouki et al. 2012; Marzouki and Oullier 2012)
in the sense that social media provided a tool for exercising political freedoms,
public empowerment, and the fundamental right to free speech. Compared to former
revolutions, the 2011 Arab revolutions stand as an illustration of political change
brought about by the people despite of the absence of a strong leader guiding the
movement. The reported study shows that ICT have replaced the role of a
paternalistic leader and empowered citizens to fight for a democratic turn on their
own by connecting through social media.
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In a similar way, the use of ICT in the medical field empowers patients to self-
monitor and manage chronic disease conditions (e.g. via recording blood glucose
measurements, caloric intake, weight). So-called e-health applications furthermore
enable patients to benefit in an effective manner from their right to free movement
within Europe. The use of ICT in the medical field also empowers health care
professionals to directly and effectively implement public health policy goals by
contributing to guarantee an equal access to high-quality and safe health care
services (e.g. by resorting to restricted availability of certain health care services in
rural areas, Ferraud-Ciandet 2010; Bu¨schel submitted; Fromson 2013), respond to
the challenges of a growing demand in health care needs and help save costs linked
to increasing health care spending.
In democratic societies, opinions diverge however as to the question whether the
processing of personal data via ICT for the purposes of protecting human health and
security is legitimate and which should be the legal rules governing it. This article is
based on the assumption that the perception by citizens of the risks and
opportunities of the processing of personal data reflects a ‘‘privacy paradox’’.
Whereas in some circumstances, the disclosure of personal data seems to be
accepted as being part of modern life (Hallinan et al. 2012), for example because it
may provide individuals with benefits in terms of health and security protection,5 it
is less or not at all tolerated in other circumstances because it is perceived as a threat
to privacy inspiring fear6 (Hallinan et al. 2012). In fact, ‘‘[w]ith improved access to
health information comes the increased risk of unauthorised access’’ (OECD 2013).
Hallinan et al. (2012) showed in their meta-analysis of public opinion surveys based
on a Europe wide sample population (i.e., Special Eurobarometer survey 359, Flash
Eurobarometer survey 225, a survey of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner of
2008 and other studies and surveys) that citizens in Europe perceive personal data as
not receiving the protection they deserve. They claimed that ‘‘an understanding of
how the public understand and approach these issues is conspicuously lacking and
often appears replaced by superficial assumptions as to what ‘the public’ want or
need’’, thus leading to ‘‘an underevaluation of privacy as a social value’’. The
authors explain that the lack of clarity regarding data processing feeds uncertainty,
which in turn explains public fear regarding the consequences of data processing.
They observed however that ‘‘[d]espite this, the public deterministically accept an
increase in the release of data, simply as a necessity and consequence of life in the
modern world’’. They concluded that citizens ‘‘are being forced to act in an
environment they have little template for approaching’’.
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the way according to which different
disciplines (psychology, medical ethics, European law) deal with the ‘‘privacy
5 For example, medical data being registered on an electronic health insurance card might contribute to
better health care performance, as it enables medical doctors, in case of life-threatening emergency, to
find out without delay about allergies against drugs of the patient; another example is the registration of
personal data of citizens of one country residing in another country with their embassy enabling them to
be contacted in case of a major threat to public security.
6 Citizens especially fear ID fraud and the use of information without knowledge, data sharing with third
parties without having consented and, more generally, the use of data for purposes other than those
consented for.
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paradox’’. What we consider to be an important new insight is the fact that the
privacy paradox is the result of a citizen empowerment process, that is the claim for,
and recognition of an effective protection of persons’ fundamental rights, including
the right to dispose of one’s own data. The shift towards enhanced personal
autonomy is being boosted by technological advances, such as providing tools for
real time monitoring of persons (e.g. personalized care, video-surveillance for
purposes of crime prevention). As human health and security are fields that have
been traditionally regulated by States in a ‘‘paternalistic’’ manner, new conflicts
may arise over the control of personal data.
The Psychological Perspective
Previous studies in interpersonal psychology have shown that sharing a small
amount of personal information within dyads of people promotes intimacy
reciprocation and increases confidence (Shaffer et al. 1982). It was also revealed
that the main predictor of such self-disclosure is the self-monitoring abilities toward
other’s expectations (Davis 1982). In the new Internet era, such as in blogging
behaviours, some empirical studies revealed that self-disclosure is highly influenced
by anonymity, self-awareness, and perceived audience size (Okdie 2011). Other
studies on social networking platforms showed that choosing whether to disclose or
keep secret personal data is a balancing act. A study on information disclosure and
control on Facebook by adolescents and young adults shows that despite concerns
for privacy induced by the disclosure of personal data, the survey population chose
to disclose voluntarily personal data such as birthdays, e-mail addresses, profile
pictures, pictures with friends, including pictures at parties (Christofies et al. 2009).
The authors state that while Facebook provides an easy information sharing tool, it
changes the nature of social relationships. Among the personality factors associated
with online information control and disclosure, they identified the need for
popularity, self-esteem, trust, as well as a general tendency to disclose. For the study
population, ‘‘the need to be part of their social group and the need for popularity are
key elements in their lives’’ (Christofies et al. 2009). While stating that different
psychological factors are involved in the control and disclosure of personal data, the
authors claim that more research is needed especially for explaining what factors
lead to control the release of such data (Norberg et al. 2007; Christofies et al. 2009).
Another study shows that views about the use of electronic health records differ
according to personal circumstances, such as health status, age, socioeconomic
factors, healthcare experiences, specific purpose of the use of the data contained in
the electronic health record. For example, while UK adults and young people have
expressed concerns about privacy, security, as well as control over access, use and
misuse of personal data, they were in favour of using them for public health research
and surveillance related to cancer (Luchenski et al. 2012).
A study on the use of mobile phones for increasing mental health and human
well-being (mHealth) shows that mobile phone applications specifically associated
with behavioural health including ‘‘developmental disorders, cognitive disorders,
substance-related disorders as well as psychotic and mood disorders’’ respond to the
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shortcomings of conventional assessment procedures, namely difficulties in gath-
ering information from the individual subject during the day (Luchenski et al. 2012).
The authors argue that ‘‘since the phone is an integrated part of both the individual
and the social life’’, self-monitoring applications allow researchers to record
behavioural data in a discrete manner and in real time. For example, T2 Mood
Tracker is an application which enables patients to self-monitor emotional
experiences associated with behavioural health issues like post-traumatic stress,
brain injury, life stress, depression, anxiety. However, as Boyce (2012) has pointed
out recently, evidence of the effectiveness of such cyberpsychological tools for
improving individual health and well-being is still limited. A clinical advisor to
diabetes UK has nonetheless stressed that the ability to share peoples’ feelings was
encouraging to them and that social media were used by patients to get moral support
from their peers when they weren’t doing so well (Boyce 2012). A major challenge
and real threat to the individual’s privacy lies in the risk of leaking personal data. In
this respect, the use of ICT in the fields of health and security opens up ‘‘new
vulnerabilities to patients and medical facilities’’ (Luchenski et al. 2012).
The Medical–Ethical Perspective
In many European health care systems we observe a transition from paper-based to
electronic handling of patient records. This technological shift consisting of
digitalizing medical data is aimed at improving health care, reducing fraud,
reducing medical errors, and saving lives (Mordini and Ottolini 2007; Ferraud-
Ciandet 2011; Bu¨schel submitted). Indeed, the quality of health care services may
be improved through the tele-monitoring of epidemiological data, seeking expert
advice and collaborating on certain medical acts despite of geographical distance.
One of the risks for privacy related to this practice consists in fraud about the
medical identity of a person. It may however be prevented through genetic
fingerprints. Biometric identification may help eliminate or drastically reduce
medical errors due to patient misidentification and wrong administration of
medication, and save lives in cases of emergency (natural disasters, transportation
accidents, acts of terrorism and other mass destruction events). The European
Union, ‘‘as a political, historical and ethical project, […] endeavours to bring
together countries which share and together promote common values, such as […]
fundamental rights’’ (European Parliament 2013). The protection and promotion of
these values is strengthened by the instruments adopted and activities carried out
under the auspices of the Council of Europe. Therefore, when processing medical
data in Europe, fundamental rights and ethical principles such as autonomy and non-
discrimination must be observed. Indeed, it should be guaranteed that patients
whose data are being processed have given express, free and informed consent. This
requirement is specifically critical with regard to minors and patients suffering from
mental disabilities. For example, in the context of the Swiss law pre-project on
electronic patient records discussions are ongoing about how much autonomy
should be given to patients to restrict emergency information release that is in their
own interest. The underlying idea is that patient information that is important in a
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medical emergency should be accessible by all doctors while other information that
is not relevant, for example the fact that the patient is undergoing psychotherapy, is
more strictly protected. While it is certainly easier to set a default mechanism about
which information should be included in the accessible emergency package, patients
could and probably should in addition be asked whether they agree to it and ask for
the hiding part of the emergency information. There could be a paternalistic
justification not to allow patients to restrict accessibility of emergency information
if that will harm them. Even more important in a pluralistic society governed by the
harm principle (Mill 1860) are arguments that refer to the fact that patients who hide
emergency information could cause harm to the health care system since expensive
tests would need to be repeated by doctors although results might have already been
available in the electronic records, and time would be lost in the diagnostic and
therapeutic process, for example Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds might be occupied
longer than necessary which could harm other patients that are waiting for an ICU
bed. While it is is important to protect privacy rights, new technologies create
situations where more discussion is needed concerning limits to individual freedoms
based on possible harm to others or society.
Furthermore, according to the principle of non-discrimination, ‘‘[s]ystems should
be designed so that as many people as possible can use them effectively with the
minimum of discomfort. Particular attention should be […] paid to avoid any
discrimination against ageing […and] patients who cannot provide, permanently or
temporarily, the requisite biometric characteristics’’ (e.g. impossibility to provide
fingerprints if the skin is burned, Mordini and Ottolini 2007).
The European Law Perspective
Law in general, and European law in particular—due to ambitious fundamental
rights protection instruments,7 strong Constitutional traditions in the field of data
protection (European Commission 2010) and efficient control mechanisms (Mehdi
2012)—has an important role to play in the protection of the individual against
breaches of his/her fundamental rights stemming from privacy-intrusive technol-
ogies. This is especially true since the revision of the Lisbon Treaty conferring a
binding character on the closely related rights to the respect for private and family
life and to the protection of personal data (Art. 7 and 8 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU, European Court of Justice 2010, 2011) and
providing for a specific legal basis for adopting privacy laws independently from
internal market aspects (Art. 16 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU).
In order to safeguard individual privacy, European law—which prevails over
national laws—prohibits the processing of personal data unless the data subject has
given his/her express, free and informed consent. However, whether data subjects
will give their consent or not depends on their perception of ICT and the trust they
7 To quote only the most frequently invoked instruments: European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), Treaty on the European Union, Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
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place in the safety of the data processing process. Inversely, the privacy-respecting
or -intrusive impact of ICT influences the well-being of the individual (BVerfG
2010),8 as well as the exercise of political rights by civil society (Marzouki et al.
2012; Marzouki and Oullier 2012). Indeed, in its Census-judgment, the German
Constitutional Court decided that depriving citizens of knowing ‘‘who knows what
when about [them] and in which situation […]’’ and thus, restricting the exercise of
their right to informational self-determination ‘‘would not only limit the possibilities
for personal development of the individual, but also the common good, because self-
determination is an essential prerequisite for a free and democratic society that is
based on the capacity and solidarity of its citizens’’ (BVerfG 1983; European
Commission 2010). Nyst (2013), Head of International Advocacy at Privacy
International, has put the idea in these terms: ‘‘privacy is the fundamental barrier
that stands in the way of complete State control and domination. […] A citizenry
unable to form or communicate private thoughts without the interference of the
State will not only be deprived of their right to privacy, they will be deprived of
their human dignity’’. The more citizens are aware about the risks for privacy
induced by ICT, the more likely it is that their autonomy is respected and the more
effectively their fundamental rights to privacy and data protection are being
guaranteed. Under European law, however, the rights to respect for private life and
to the protection of personal data are not absolute rights. They must be considered in
relation to their function in society (see, for example, the judgments of the European
Court of Justice in joint cases Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, C-92/09 and
93/09, para. 48 and Deutsche Telekom, C-543/09, para. 51). According to Art. 52(1)
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the exercise of those
rights may be limited, ‘‘so long as those limitations are provided for by law, respect
the essence of those rights, and, in accordance with the principle of proportionality,
are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the
Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’’ (judgment of the
European Court of Justice in the case of Michael Schwarz v. Stadt Bochum of
October 17th 2013, C-291/12, para. 34).
We chose two concrete examples, electronic prescriptions and passenger name
record data to illustrate the privacy paradox in the fields of human health and
security and the challenges they pose from the European law perspective.
Processing of Data for Human Health Protection
Health-related data being closely linked to the most intimate elements of the private
sphere, that is, a person’s body and mind, the processing without prior consent of
data concerning individuals’ health is in principle prohibited. However, exceptions
to this rule may be justified according to Art. 8 para. 3 of Directive 95/46/EC if
‘‘required for the purposes of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision
of care or treatment or the management of health-care services, and where those
8 The German Federal Constitutional Court established the link between ‘‘the storage of telecommu-
nications traffic data without occasion’’ and its impact on individual well-being by stating that it ‘‘is
capable of creating a diffusely threatening feeling of being watched which can impair a free exercise of
fundamental rights in many areas’’ at para. 212 of this decision.
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data are processed by a health professional subject under national law or rules
established by national competent bodies to the obligation of professional secrecy or
by another person also subject to an equivalent obligation of secrecy’’. Furthermore,
the processing of personal data by Member States may be authorized if it is related
to an ‘‘event posing a health threat, […or] to the health conditions of […] infected
persons and of persons potentially exposed to contamination […] within the [Early
Warning and Response System]’’ (European Commission 2012: para. 4). It has been
shown elsewhere that ICT provide tools capable of ‘‘improv[ing] disease
prevention, diagnosis and treatment, facilitat[ing] patient safety and improv[ing]
health systems’ coordination, us[age] of resources and sustainability and reduc[ing]
waiting times and errors’’ (e.g., Kierkegaard 2012). Expectations towards the use of
electronic prescriptions across Europe for improving the quality of health care are
high. By enabling a prescriber to send an ‘‘accurate, error-free and understandable
prescription directly to a pharmacy’’, but also nurses to administer medicines and
pharmacies to review orders and manage the supply of medicines electronically,
e-prescriptions are considered to constitute tools that contribute to the development
of new higher quality and more cost-efficient health care models. However, by
multiplying access points to the medical data of patients (e.g. concerning a specific
condition or treatment), the risk for privacy breaches and medical identity theft
becomes higher (Joh 2011; Kierkegaard 2012). Possible consequences of medical
identity theft may consist in patients receiving the wrong medication, finding their
health insurance exhausted, and failing physical exams for employment due to the
wrongful presence of diseases in their health record (Mordini and Ottolini 2007).
Another concern highlighted by Quinn et al. (2013) is that mHealth services require
users to consent on a much more regular basis than needed for conventional medical
services, which ‘‘may entail a reduction in the attention patients give to such
requests’’.
In order to be compatible with the high standard of fundamental rights protection
in Europe, it is important for European laws to provide appropriate safeguards, such
as effective mechanisms for controlling the respect data protection principles such
as purpose-limitation, necessity and proportionality. With this regard, accountability
and liability mechanisms making it possible to obtain compensation for damages
caused by data leakage create incentives for guaranteeing the highest possible
security level, thus fostering trust in the processing of data.
Processing of Data for Reasons of Public Security
In reaction to the terrorist attacks of 11th September, the United States (US) enacted
a new legislation concerning the processing of travellers’ data. It obliges air carriers
operating flights to or from the US or across US territory to provide the US Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection with an electronic access to the data contained in
their reservation and departure control systems (so-called ‘‘Passenger Name
Records’’ or ‘‘PNR data’’). Because this legislation also covers data collected by
airlines subject to EU law operating flights to or from the US, the question arises as
to whether its privacy-intrusive character was compatible with EU data protection
rules. What turned out to be particularly problematic is the use, by a US State
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authority, for the purposes of public security protection, of data collected by airlines
in the course of their commercial activity. Indeed, according to European law, the
processing of data for other purposes than those for which they have initially been
collected, as it risks violating the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection,
is in principle prohibited. However, exceptions to violations of fundamental rights
may be justified for reasons of overriding general interest such as the protection of
public security, given the respect of procedural safeguards (Labayle and Mehdi
2009). This means that for personal data processing to be legal, a balance needs to
be struck between the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection and
overriding reasons of individual or general interest. Striking a balance between
privacy and security requires reaching a fair distribution of control over personal
data. ‘Fairness’ in this context means that the control over his/her own data must lie
with the data subject, unless the sharing of these data is justified by overriding
reasons of general interest such as, for example, the investigation and prosecution of
terrorist offences and serious crime. In order to be able to keep control over one’s
personal data, European data protection principles require that each individual
whose personal data are being processed be recognized with the rights of access to
his or her personal data, as well as the rights of rectification, erasure or blocking of
such data (see infra).
Following the annulment, on 30th May 2006, by the European Court of Justice,
of the Council Decision 2004/496/EC of 17th May 2004 on the conclusion of an
Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on
the processing and transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers, new Agreements have been
negotiated between the EU and the US, the EU and Canada and the EU and
Australia. With respect to the free movement of persons within the Schengen Area,
the European Commission adopted a Proposal for a Directive of the Council and the
European Parliament on the use of PNR data for the prevention, detection,
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime of February 2,
2011 providing that PNR data of aircraft passengers may be transferred by air
carriers to Passenger Information Units (PIUs) of the Member States (European
Commission 2011d). PIUs are national authorities responsible for collecting PNR
data from the air carriers, storing them, processing and transmitting them or the
result of the processing to other authorities entitled to request or receive such data
for the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting terrorist
offences and serious crime. The Proposal provides that Member States ensure that
air carriers inform passengers taking flights in a clear and precise manner about the
transmission of PNR data to the PIU, ‘‘the purposes of their processing, the period
of data retention, their possible use to prevent, detect, investigate or prosecute
terrorist offences and serious crime, the possibility of exchanging and sharing such
data and their data protection rights, in particular the right to complain’’ (Art. 11,
para. 5). In respect of all processing of PNR data pursuant to this directive, it is
foreseen that ‘‘every passenger shall have the same right to access, the right to
rectification, erasure and blocking, the right to compensation and the right to
judicial redress’’ (Art. 11, para. 1 of the Proposal). Recently however, the European
Parliament rejected the proposal for a European PNR system (Peyrou 2013), arguing
that evidence was lacking for the effectiveness of collecting PNR data in the fight
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against terrorism. Indeed, as the Boston marathon and Merah case in France have
shown, the fact that law enforcement authorities had been disposing of data of the
responsible persons was not sufficient for preventing or avoiding the attacks against
public security. Furthermore, both the European Parliament and European Data
Protection Supervisor expressed concerns as to the transparency and proportionality
of the proposed measures (Marx 2013).
Opaqueness, jurisprudential instability and weak efficacy of privacy-protecting
rules are detrimental to legal certainty. In a democratic society governed by the rule
of law, they challenge the requirement of law to be predictable. The quest must
therefore be one for privacy protection rules which are transparent, which benefit
from judicial guarantees and which are user-friendly.
Jurisprudential Instability Due to a Case-Based Balancing Between Conflicting
Rights and Values
While national and European authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation for
defining health and security policies, it is required in a democratic society governed
by the rule of law that exceptions to any legal rule or principle justified by the
general interest be foreseen by law and are necessary, proportional and subject to
judicial control (e.g., Cammilleri-Subrenat et al. 2012; Verdier-Bu¨schel and
Prouve`ze 2011). In the Leander v. Sweden case, the European Court of Human
Rights (1987) stated that ‘‘in view of the risk that a system of secret surveillance for
the protection of national security poses of undermining or even destroying
democracy on the ground of defending it, the Court must be satisfied that there exist
adequate and effective guarantees against abuse’’. While this Court confirmed in Z.
v. Finland (1997) that the protection of medical data is fundamental to a person’s
enjoyment of his/her right to private life according to Art. 8 of the ECHR, it
accepted at the same time that ‘‘the interests of a patient and the community as a
whole in protecting the confidentiality of medical data may be outweighed by the
interest in investigation and prosecution of crime and in the publicity of court
proceedings […], where such interests are shown to be of even greater importance’’.
In the present case, the applicant’s health data related to her infection with HIV had
been seized at hospital by the police in the framework of investigations being
carried out about the applicant’s ex-husband, who was accused of attempted
manslaughter through rapes, by which he was supposed to have deliberately
subjected his victims to a risk of HIV infection. The European Court of Human
Rights considered that the ‘‘seizure of the applicant’s medical records and their
inclusion in the investigation file were supported by relevant and sufficient reasons,
the weight of which was such as to override the applicant’s interest in the
information in question not being communicated’’. More precisely, they served to
determine when the husband of the applicant, who refused to give evidence against
the latter, had become aware of his HIV infection, as indeed knowledge about the
date of infection was crucial for the determination of the penalty. Under these
specific circumstances, the Court considered that the measures were proportionate to
the legitimate aims pursued. In the S. and Marper v. United Kingdom case however,
the European Court of Human Rights (2008) decided that the retention for an
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unlimited period of time of fingerprint and DNA information in a nationwide
database for criminal-identification purposes constituted a disproportionate inter-
ference with the right to respect for private life of the applicants, which could not be
regarded as necessary in a democratic society. Recently, the question arose before
the Luxemburg-based European Court of Justice whether taking fingerprints and
storing them in passports constitutes a threat to the rights to respect for private life
and the protection of personal data. As fingerprints contain unique information
about individuals allowing them to be identified with precision, they constitute
personal data. Subsequently, the Court decided that the taking and storing of
fingerprints by national authorities constitutes a threat to respect for private life and
the protection of personal data. However, it considered that this threat is being
justified by an objective pursued by Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004
(especially Art. 1(2) read in the light of recitals 2 and 3), which it recognized as
being of general interest: preventing the fraudulent use of passports and
consequently, illegal entry into the European Union. Indeed, the Court considered
that the taking and storing of fingerprints when issuing passports is necessary and
appropriate for preventing the falsification of passports and the fraudulent use
thereof and, ‘‘by extension, […] illegal entry to the European Union’’ (para. 45).
When examining the proportionality of the relevant provision which provides for
passports and travel documents to include fingerprints in interoperable formats, the
Court stressed that it ‘‘does not provide for the storage of fingerprints except within
the passport itself, which belongs to the holder alone’’ (para. 60). Excluding the
centralized storage of data or the use of such data ‘‘for purposes other than that of
preventing illegal entry into the European Union’’ (para. 61), it concluded that it is a
proportionate measure.
Intrusion into privacy for reasons of public security would be completely ‘‘off-
limit’’ for all times under all circumstances when they are not foreseen by law and/
or are disproportionate. One could imagine the processing of personal data such as
fingerprints in order to investigate on a minor offence, e.g. for tagging or bicycle
theft.
Another hurdle to the efficacy of privacy-protecting rules is the balance between
technical precision and the requirement of legal rules to be general enough to cover
future technological innovations.
A risk for the Efficacy of Privacy-Protecting Rules
With regard to the increasing sophistication of ICT, the legal rules governing
privacy protection risk to become the prerogative of a select band of insiders with
the consequence of jeopardising legal efficacy (Mehdi 2012). Indeed, the
‘‘performance’’ and quality of law might be affected in the sense that there risks
to be a mismatch between the objective of privacy-protective legal rules and their
effective implementation. Such an asymmetry might be the result on the one hand,
of the lack of indispensable technical knowledge for applying correctly these rules
and on the other hand, the necessity for the law to provide for privacy-protective
rules which are general enough to cover the widest possible range of rapidly
evolving technological innovations. In order to enhance the efficacy of privacy-
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protective rules, the EU developed impact assessment and evaluation mechanisms,
and has been introducing experts and the public to the legislative process. In its
2011 Strategy for a Corporate Social Responsibility, the European Commission put
forward ‘‘the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society’’. To fully
meet their social responsibility, enterprises ‘‘should have in place a process to
integrate social, environmental, ethical human rights and consumer concerns into
their business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with their
stakeholders’’ (European Commission 2011c). Protecting the individual against
illegal processing of personal data should indeed not only be a duty of public
authorities, but also of private companies and citizens. The three main features of
such a general social responsibility are highlighted in the Proposal for a Charter of
Human Responsibilities. This Charter is supposed to constitute a third ethical pillar
common to all societies and social spheres completing the two existing pillars which
are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United
Nations (Calame 2003: 99). According to this Charter, responsibility comprises
‘‘accepting responsibility for the direct and indirect consequences of our actions;
uniting with one another to escape from powerlessness; acknowledging that our
responsibility is proportional to the knowledge and power which each of us holds’’.
In the light of this Charter, the exercise of any power is only legitimate ‘‘where it
serves the common good, and if it is accountable to those over whom it is
exercised’’. Even though the principles contained in the Charter are not binding, we
suggest that with regard to the distribution of power on the internet through the
detention of digital data (e.g. by undertakings referred to as ‘‘GAFAM’’ for Google,
Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, but also by individual internet users), they
could guide the exercise of responsibilities in a way that more access to information,
knowledge and power strengthens the duty to account for data processing.
When surveilling his/her neighbours, the individual should be respectful of their
fundamental right to privacy. The intensity of surveillance and thus, risk of intrusion
into private life, must be in relation to the severity of the harm which one aims to
prevent through surveillance. Judges—if being seized—are in a position to
guarantee the effectiveness of the protection of the rights to privacy and personal
data by sanctioning unjustified violations of these rights. However, technical hurdles
subsist concerning the judicial control of the identity of a data subject on the
Internet (especially with regard to age and capacity to give express, free and
informed consent), but also concerning interoperability due to different technical
standards, as well as the lack of transparency with regard to responsibility allocation
between operators of websites and individuals (e.g. the right to erasure and blocking
of data, European Court of Justice Opinion of Advocate General Ja¨a¨skinen 2013
and, more generally, questions related to cloud computing, Peyrou 2013).
Solutions Provided by Law for Dealing with the ‘‘Privacy Paradox’’
Law offers two solutions for dealing with the ‘‘privacy paradox’’: regulating the design
of technology collecting data and the control over the data obtained. Technically, it is
possible to achieve at the same time a high standard of privacy protection and a high
level of human health and security through the adoption of an integrated approach
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(application of the principle of ‘‘privacy by design’’, EDPS 2010; Cammilleri-Subrenat
et al. 2012; Cammilleri-Subrenat 2012), that is the development of ‘‘privacy enhancing
technologies’’ (PET). Until now, there seem to exist only very few practical examples
of PET, mainly due to the costs and restricted possibilities for exploitation of processed
data in conformity with a high level of privacy protection (see also Baeriswyl and
Rudin 2012). As an example of PET, taking photographs through active imagery—
which is a discrete technology using invisible laser light—has to be compatible with
health and privacy protection rules. The latter was the key feature of the ‘‘IAAIS’’-
project, which was financed by the French National Research Agency and included
representatives of the State Department, Department of Defence and Department of
Justice, as well as industrial partners, among which Sagem. Engineers, stakeholders and
lawyers have been closely collaborating for 24 months in order to implement the
principle of privacy by design, which means to integrate the requirements of protecting
privacy and personal data from the earliest phase of design on throughout the whole
technological elaboration process. Another example for the application of the privacy
by design principle concerns security scanners at airports, which gave rise to concerns
about the protection of diverse fundamental rights such as privacy and data protection,
but also human dignity and health. Following a European Parliament resolution adopted
in response to the proposal for introducing such scanners on the list of eligible methods
and technologies for screening persons, the European Commission launched a public
consultation and carried out an impact assessment. The legislation, finally adopted in
2011, grants leeway to Member States and/or airports as to the mandatory or optional
use of security scanners and prohibits the storage, retainment, copying, printing or
retrieval of images, as well as unauthorised access to and use of the obtained images
(European Commission 2011a, b). Furthermore, it grants passengers the right to opt out
from being subject to security scanners in favour of an alternative screening method
(European Commission Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified
Health Risks SCENIHR 2012).
Additionally to promoting PET design, and with regard to the ‘‘dramatic
expansion of secret and unaccountable surveillance, as well as the growing
collaboration between governments and vendors of surveillance technology that
establish new forms of social control’’ (recital 6 of the Madrid Privacy Declaration,
2009), the EU seeks to strengthen transparency, accountability and security. The
European Union addresses these issues through the adoption, among other
instruments, of a strategy which clarifies the principles that should guide
cybersecurity policy in the EU and internationally (European Commission and
High Representative for the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Joint Communication 2013). At 2.5, the Joint Communication declares that ‘‘the EU
international engagement in cyber issues will be guided by the EU’s core values of
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for
fundamental rights’’. Among other measures, this implies the development of new
public guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, monitoring the export
of products or services that might be used for censorship or mass surveillance
online, the development of measures and tools to expand Internet access, openness
and resilience to address censorship or mass surveillance by communication
technology.
Protecting Human Health and Security in Digital Europe 653
123
Within the ongoing EU Data Protection reform, it is planned to generalize the
obligation according to which data breaches have to be notified. Indeed, inspired by
the personal data breach notification in Article 4(3) of the e-Privacy Directive
2002/58/EC, Articles 31 and 32 of the Commission Proposal for a Data Protection
Regulation of January 25 2012, and Articles 28 and 29 of the Commission Proposal
for a Data Protection Directive for the purposes of prevention, investigation,
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties,
and the free movement of such data introduce an obligation to notify personal data
breaches. In exceptional circumstances, the obligation to notify may be delayed,
restricted or omitted. This may be the case if Member States have adopted
legislative measures allowing the partial or complete retention of data when this
‘‘constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society with due
regard for the legitimate interests of the person concerned. For example, (a) to avoid
obstructing official or legal inquiries, investigations or procedures; (b) to avoid
prejudicing the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal
offences or for the execution of criminal penalties; (c) to protect public security;
(d) to protect national security; (e) to protect the rights and freedoms of others’’
(Art. 11, para. 4 of the Proposal for a Data Protection Directive; see also Art. 3,
para. 5 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 611/2013). Furthermore, ‘‘[t]he
communication of a personal data breach to the data subject shall not be required if
the controller demonstrates to the satisfaction of the supervisory authority that it has
implemented appropriate technological protection measures, and that those
measures were applied to the personal data concerned by the personal data breach.
Such technological protection measures shall render the data unintelligible to any
person who is not authorised to access it’’ (Art. 29, para. 3 of the Proposal for a Data
Protection Directive; see also Art. 4 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 611/2013).
According to point 5 of the Commission Recommendation on the implementation
of privacy and data protection principles in applications supported by radio-
frequency identification, ‘‘Member States should ensure that operators, together
with national competent authorities and civil society organisations, develop new
schemes, or apply existing schemes, such as certification or operator self-
assessment, in order to demonstrate that an appropriate level of information
security and protection of privacy is established in relation to the assessed risks’’
(European Commission 2009). Whereas this Recommendation has no binding legal
effect, the Draft EU Data Protection Regulation of January 2012 provides for a
binding impact assessment to be carried out in cases where ‘‘processing operations
present specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects’’ (Art. 33 § 1).9
9 Among these specific risks, Art. 33 § 2 lists namely the following: ‘‘(a) a systematic and extensive
evaluation of personal aspects relating to a natural person or for analysing or predicting in particular the
natural person’s economic situation, location, health, personal preferences, reliability or behaviour, which
is based on automated processing and on which measures are based that produce legal effects concerning
the individual or significantly affect the individual; (b) information on sex life, health, race and ethnic
origin or for the provision of health care, epidemiological researches, or surveys of mental or infectious
diseases, where the data are processed for taking measures or decisions regarding specific individuals on a
large scale; (c) monitoring publicly accessible areas, especially when using optic-electronic devices
(video surveillance) on a large scale; (d) personal data in large scale filing systems on children, genetic
data or biometric data; (e)….’’.
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In the currently discussed version of the Proposal for the Regulation, such impact
assessments are mandatory. Supervisory authorities are empowered to impose
administrative sanctions in case of failure to carry them out.
In order to ensure an effective application of fundamental rights, it is important to
provide for the legal framework—including ‘‘widely accepted privacy and security
standards for personal data collection, analysis and use’’ (OECD 2013)—as well as
judicial remedies (Art. 47 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU). With this
respect, the Draft EU Data Protection Regulation adopts an approach similar to the
one which characterizes European consumer protection regulations, in the sense that
it is person-centred. In the field of data protection, this approach is captured by
mandatory provisions such as the obligation to obtain informed consent, the rights
to revoke, to be forgotten and to ask for personal data to be erased (Kilian 2012).
Furthermore, within the ongoing data protection reform, exportation of personal
data to another service provider will be facilitated. However, legal guarantees are
not sufficient on their own: ‘‘equal thoroughness must be given to the development
of quality assurance, monitoring of use, identification of potential adverse outcomes
or intentional abuses, constructive reporting and analysis of incidents and events,
and creation of appropriate controls, mechanisms and regulation’’ (OECD 2013).
In conclusion, there is no denial that interdisciplinary collaborations taking
account of the social, ethical and legal impacts of ICT on human health and security
are the sine qua non condition for the respect and promotion of individuals’ well-
being. Closely correlated to a high level of fundamental rights protection, the latter
is a promising feature of the so-called ‘‘e-democracy’’ as a new way to collectively
attribute meaning to large-scale online actions, motivations and ideas. In order to
support better practices and build trust in ICT, more research needs to be done about
access controls and audit, encryption, mobile health, as well as identification and
authentification (OECD 2013). The added value of this paper consists in bridging an
existing theoretical gap, namely adopting a transdisciplinary approach to the
‘‘privacy paradox’’ aimed at furthering the understanding of the phenomenon in
order to enable the adoption of a holistic view in future design of ICT and regulation
of their use in the fields of human health and security, for better compliance with
fundamental rights.
References
Baeriswyl, B. & Rudin, B. (2012). Privacy enhancing technologies (PET) versprechen (zu) viel bei der
Umsetzung von neuen Technologien. digma—Zeitschrift fu¨r Datenrecht und Informationssicherheit
(pp. 18–21).
Banisar, D., & Davies, S. (1999). Global trends in privacy protection: An international survey of privacy,
data protection and surveillance laws and developments. John Marshall Journal of Computer &
Information Law, 18, 1–98.
Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity. London: Sage.
Boyce, N. (2012). Maps, apps, and evidence? The Lancet, 379(9833), 2231.
Brosset, E. (2012). Bre`ves observation sur un secret de Polichinelle: l’influence du droit europe´en sur le
droit me´dical a` travers l’exemple du secret me´dical. In Leca (A.), Le secret me´dical, Cahiers du Sud-
Est de droit de la sante´, Les e´tudes hospitalie`res.
Protecting Human Health and Security in Digital Europe 655
123
Bu¨schel, I. (submitted). Te´le´me´decine et droit de l’Union europe´enne: reme`de, opportunite´, de´fi. Journal
International de Bioe´thique.
BVerfGE, 1 BvR 256/08, Decision of 2.3.2010 (‘‘Vorratsdatenspeicherung’’). http://www.bverfg.de/
entscheidungen/rs20100302_1bvr025608.html. Accessed January 6, 2013.
BVerfGE 65, 1, 44, Decision of 15.12.1983 (‘‘Volksza¨hlung’’).
Calame, P. (2003). Tools for social and economic responsibility: The charter of human responsibilities. In
Council of Europe (2003). Civil society and new social responsibilities based on ethical foundations.
http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialcohesiondev/source/trends/trends-07_en.pdf. Accessed
November 4, 2013.
Cammilleri-Subrenat, A. (2012). Le privacy by design confronte´ a` la disparition des piliers du Traite´ de
Lisbonne. http://www.ceric-aix.univ-cezanne.fr/fileadmin/CERIC/Documents/manifestations_
scientifiques/AnnexeManifestations/Atelier_PbD_23_MarsFin_En_.pdf. Accessed June 28, 2013.
Cammilleri-Subrenat, A., Prouve`ze, R., & Verdier-Bu¨schel, I. (2012). Nouvelles technologies et de´fis du
droit en Europe—L’imagerie active au service de la se´curite´ globale. Bruxelles: Bruylant.
Cattan, J. (2012). Le droit et les communications e´lectroniques. Ph.D. dissertation, under the supervision
of Prof. H. Isar and R. Mehdi, Law School, University Aix-Marseille.
Chevallier, J. (1983). L’ordre juridique. In CURAPP, Le droit en proce`s (p. 34). Paris: PUF.
Christofies, E., Muise, A., & Desmarais, S. (2009). Information disclosure and control on Facebook: Are
they two sides of the same coin or two different processes? Cyber Psychology & Behavior, 12(3),
341–345.
Council of the European Union Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for
security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States, OJ L
385, 29.12.2004, pp. 1–6.
Davis, D. (1982). Determinants of responsiveness in dyadic interaction. In W. Ickes & E. S. Knowles
(Eds.), Personality, roles, and social behavior (pp. 85–139). New York: Springer-Verlag.
EDPS (2010). Opinion on promoting trust in the information society by fostering data protection and privacy.
http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/
2010/10-03-19_Trust_Information_Society_EN.pdf. Accessed January 24, 2012.
European Commission (2001). Communication to the Council and the European Parliament: Information
and communication technologies in development—The role of ICTs in EC development policy,
COM (2001) 770 final. http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/com2001_0770en01_en.
pdf. Accessed July 14, 2013.
European Commission (2009). Recommendation of 12 May 2009 on the implementation of privacy and
data protection principles in applications supported by radio-frequency identification (notified under
document number C(2009) 3200), OJ L 122, 16.5.2009, pp. 47–51.
European Commission (2010). Comparative Study on different approaches to new privacy challenges in
particular in the light of technological developments. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/
docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_en.pdf. Accessed July 3, 2013.
European Commission (2011a). Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1147/2011 of 11 November 2011
amending Regulation (EU) No 185/2010 implementing the common basic standards on civil
aviation security as regards the use of security scanners at EU airports, OJ L 294, 12.11.2011,
pp. 7–11.
European Commission (2011b). Regulation (EU) No 1141/2011 of 10 November 2011 amending
Regulation (EC) No 272/2009 supplementing the common basic standards on civil aviation security
as regards the use of security scanners at EU airports, OJ L 293, 11.11.2011, pp. 22–23.
European Commission (2011c). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
A renewed EU strategy 2011–2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM(2011) 681 final.
European Commission (2011d). Proposal of 2 February 2011 for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection,
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, COM(2011) 32 final.
European Commission (2012). Recommendation of 6 February 2012 on data protection guidelines for the
Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) (2012/73/EU).
European Commission and High Representative for the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy (2013). Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European economic
and social Committee and the Committee of the regions ‘‘Cybersecurity Strategy of the European
Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace’’, Brussels, 7.2.2013, JOIN (2013) 1 final, 20 p.
656 I. Bu¨schel et al.
123
European Commission Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks SCENIHR
(2012). Health effects of security scanners for passenger screening (based on X-ray technology).
http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/docs/scenihr_o_036.pdf. Accessed July
11, 2013.
European Court of Human Rights, Leander v. Sweden, judgment of 26 March 1987, application no.
9248/81.
European Court of Human Rights, S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, judgment of 4 December 2008,
application nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04.
European Court of Human Rights, Z. v. Finland, judgment of 25 February 1997, application no.
22009/93.
European Court of Justice (2010). Judgment of 9 November 2010, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert,
Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09. European Court Reports 2010 Page I-11063.
European Court of Justice, Judgment of 24 November 2011, Asociacio´n Nacional de Establecimientos
Financieros de Cre´dito (ASNEF) and Federacio´n de Comercio Electro´nico y Marketing Directo
(FECEMD) v Administracio´n del Estado, Joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10. Not yet published in
the European Court Reports.
European Court of Justice, Opinion of Advocate General Ja¨a¨skinen delivered on 25 June 2013, Google
Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Espan˜ola de Proteccio´n de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja
Gonza´lez, Case C-131/12. Not yet published in the European Court Reports.
European Court of Justice (2013). Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 13 June 2013,
Michael Schwarz c. Stadt Bochum, Case C-291/12. Not yet published in the European Court
Reports.
European Parliament (2013). Draft Report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union
(2012) (2013/2078(INI)) of 18.9.2013, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,
Rapporteur: Louis Michel.
Ferraud-Ciandet, N. (2010). L’Union europe´enne et la te´le´sante´. Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europe´en,
46(3), 537–561.
Ferraud-Ciandet, N. (2011). Droit de la te´le´sante´ et de la te´le´me´decine. Paris: Heures de France.
Fromson, J. A. (2013). Telemedicine: Changing the landscape of rural physician practice. NEJM Career
Center. Accessed June 25, 2013.
Gaudriault, C. (2013). Interview with Paul Virilio ‘‘Inventer l’avion, c’est inventer le crash…’’. http://
www.zigzag-blog.com/spip.php?page=article&id_article=4. Accessed July 3, 2013.
Hallinan, D., Friedewald, M., & McCarthy, P. (2012). Citizens’ perceptions of data protection and
privacy in Europe. Computer Law & Security Review, 28, 263–272.
Joh, E. E. (2011). Ethics watch—DNA theft: Your genetic information at risk. Nature Reviews Genetics,.
doi:10.1038/nrg3113.
Kaplan, D. (2012). Vie prive´e a` l’horizon 2020. In CNIL, Cahiers Innovation et prospective, (Vol. 1, pp. 36–37).
http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/Guides_pratiques/Livrets/Cahier-ip/cnil_cahieripn1/index.
html. Accessed July 2, 2013.
Kierkegaard, P. (2012). E-prescription across Europe. Health and Technology,. doi:10.1007/s12553-012-
0037-0.
Kilian, W. (2012). Personal data: The impact of emerging trends in the information society—how the
marketability of personal data should affect the concept of data protection law. CRi, 6, 169–175.
Labayle, H., & Mehdi, R. (2009). Le controˆle juridictionnel de la lutte contre le terrorisme: les ‘black
lists’ de l’Union dans le pre´toire de la Cour de justice. Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europe´en, 45(2),
231–265.
Leighninger, M. (2011). Citizenship and governance in a wild, wired world: How should citizens and
public managers use online tools to improve democracy? National Civic Review, 100, 20–29.
Luchenski, S., Balasanthiran, S., Marston, C., Sasaki, K., Majeed, A., Bell, D., et al. (2012). Survey of
patient and public perceptions of electronic health records for healthcare, policy and research: Study
protocol. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making,. doi:10.1186/1472-6947-12-40.
Mackenzie, D., & Wajcman, J. (1999). The social shaping of technology (2nd ed., pp. 3–27).
Philadelphia: Open University Press.
Madrid Privacy Declaration of 3 November 2009, signed at the annual meeting of the Privacy and Data
Protection Commissioners’ conference by more than 100 civil society organizations and privacy
experts. http://thepublicvoice.org/TheMadridPrivacyDeclaration.pdf. Accessed November 4, 2013.
Protecting Human Health and Security in Digital Europe 657
123
Marx, M. (2013). The EP Committee rejects the proposal for a European Passenger Name Record System
(PNR). http://eafsj.org/2013/05/01/the-ep-committee-rejects-the-proposal-for-an-european-passanger-
name-record-system-pnr/. Accessed July 11, 2013.
Marzouki, Y. & Oullier, O. (2012, July 17). Revolutionizing revolutions: Virtual collective consciousness
and the Arab Spring. The Huffington Post US. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/yousri-marzouki/
revolutionizing-revolutio_b_1679181.html. Accessed July 2, 2013.
Marzouki, Y., Skandrani-Marzouki, I., Be´jaoui, M., Hammoudi, H., & Bellaj, T. (2012). The contribution
of Facebook to the 2011 Tunisian revolution: A cyberpsychological insight. Cyberpsychology,
Behavior, and Social Networking, 15(5), 237–244.
Mehdi, R. (2012). L’efficacite´ de la norme en droit de l’Union europe´enne. In Fatin-Rouge Stefanini, M.,
Gay, L., Vidal-Naquet, A. (Eds.), L’efficacite´ de la norme juridique: nouveau vecteur de le´gitimite´ ?
(pp. 295–331). Bruxelles: Bruylant.
Mill, J. S. (1860). On liberty (Vol. 25). Harvard: Harvard Classics.
Mordini, E., & Ottolini, C. (2007). Body identification, biometrics and medicine: Ethical and social
considerations. Ann Ist Super Sanita`, 43(1), 51–60.
Norberg, P. A., Horne, D. R., & Horne, D. A. (2007). The privacy paradox: Personal information
disclosure intentions versus behaviors. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 41, 100–126.
Nyst, C. (2013). Two sides of the same coin: The right to privacy and freedom of expression (English version
of an article in the September issue of Cuestio´n de Derechos). https://www.privacyinternational.org/
opinion-pieces/two-sides-of-the-same-coin-the-right-to-privacy-and-freedom-of-expression. Accessed
November 4, 2013.
OECD (2013). ICTs and the health sector: Towards smarter health and wellness models. Paris: OECD
Publishing. Accessed October 4, 2013.
Okdie, B. M. (2011). Blogging and self-disclosure: The role of anonimity, self-awarness and audience
size. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Psychology in the Graduate School of The University of
Alabama.
Peyrou, S. (2013). De l’accord PNR a` Prism, bilan et perspectives sur les malentendus transatlantiques:
lutte anti-terroriste versus protection des donne´es personnelles. http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/2013/
09/11/droits-fondamentaux/de-laccord-pnr-a-prism-bilan-et-perspectives-sur-les-malentendus-
transatlantiques-lutte-anti-terroriste-versus-protection-des-donnees-personnelles/. Accessed October
11, 2013.
Quinn, P., Habbig, A.-K., Mantovani, E., & De Hert, P. (2013). The data protection and medical Devie
frameworks: Obstacles to the deployment of mHealth across Europe ? European Journal of Health
Law, 20, 185–204.
Rigby, M., Ronchi, E., & Graham, S. (2013). Evidence for building a smarter health and wellness future:
Key messages and collected visions from a Joint OECD and NSF workshop. International Journal
of Medical Informatics, 82, 209–219.
Shaffer, D. R., Smith, J. E., & Tomarelli, M. (1982). Self-monitoring as a determinant of self-disclosure
reciprocity during the acquaintance process. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43(1),
163–175.
Strum, S., & Latour, B. (1999). Redefining the social link: From baboons to humans. In D. MacKenzie &
J. Wajcman (Eds.), The social shaping of technology (2nd ed., pp. 116–125). Philadelphia: Open
University Press.
Verdier-Bu¨schel, I. (2013). Medical data sharing vs. Privacy protection: Where science meets law. In
Malerba, A., Massocchi, A., Santosuosso, A. (Eds.), 2012 Law & Science Young Scholars Informal
Symposium Book of Papers (pp. 135–153). Pavia: Pavia University Press.
Verdier-Bu¨schel, I. & Prouve`ze, R. (2011). L’utilisation des nouvelles technologies de captation de
l’image et la proce´dure pe´nale. Re´flexions de droit franc¸ais et de droit europe´en. In RERDH,
Technique et droits humains, Actes du Colloque organise´ du 20 au 23 avril 2010 aux Faculte´s de
droit de Limoges et de Poitiers (pp. 93–118). Paris: Montchrestien Lextenso e´ditions.
658 I. Bu¨schel et al.
123
